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THE H02MICIDE CONCEPT
A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER'
The substantive criminal, as well as civil, law of most advanced
nations differ less radically than their divergent legal terminology
migh imply. One who has dealt with two of such systems recently
wrote:
"In the course of some twenty years' experience, I have found that,
historical accidents apart, the differences between large portions of French
and English Law are little greater than is necessarily incident to the ex-
pression of the legal concepts of one country in the language of another."2
On some points of conception and classification, however, ma-
terial differences exist and not infrequently these have a practical bear-
ing which is reflected in diverse theories of punishment. Such is the
case as regards certain phases of the homicide concept.
The Roman Law, like the Anglo-American, recognized the division
of this crime into justifiable, excusable, and felonious,3 though not under
those terms, and substantially the same classification has passed into
the Modem ,Civil Law. But in further analyzing the third form-
felonious-a divergence appears.
ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW
The English common law has always treated homicide as includ-
ing two separate crimes, viz., murder and manslaughter, the distinguish-
ing ingredient of the former being "malice" or felonious intent.4
Murder was not a divisible offense at common law nor until the
enactment of the Federal Penal Code,5 was it such under the Federal
law of the United States;6 but the statutes of many states prescribe
I judge of the United States Court for China.
2 Sir W. Bruyate, Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, in his
first Report; quoted in Journal of Society of Comparative Legislation XVII,
281. 3 Mackenzie, Roman Law (7th ed.), 415.
4 This is the grand criterion which now distinguishes murder from other
killing; and this malice prepense, malitia poe cogitata, is not so properly spite
or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design in general; the
dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart." Blackstone, Comment-
aries, IV, 198*. See also Harris, Criminal Law (3d ed.) 135, 139.
G Sec. 273. See the note thereto in Tucker & Blood's edition.6U. S. v. Outerbridge, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 978, 9, Sawy. 620; Bias v. U. S.
3 Indian Terr. 27, 53 S. W. 471.
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degrees of murder according to the circumstances under which it is
committed. Thus, premeditation is frequently the distinguishing mark
of murder in the first degree,1 while the second degree is often identi-
fied by the absence of a specific intent to kill.8
Manslaughter,9 however, was graded at common law into volun-
tary and involuntary,1" the latter being distinguished by lack of in-
tent.11  Thus the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner,
as negligently, may, if death result, constitute involuntary man-
slaugter.1 But the absence of intent greatly mitigates the offense and
reduces the penalty13 and, as a leading English author well says:
"Cases of mere carelessness, etc., legally amounting to manslaughter,
are often more appropriately punished by pecuniary fine than by the in-
iignity of imprisonment."' 14
ROMAN LAW
On the other hand the Roman law had but one crimq of this
nature, viz., hornicidium (with its aggravated form of parridicium or
slaying of a relative) and this originally .was purely a crime of intent.15
Thus, fatally wounding another with a sword was homicidium; but
striking him with an .iron key was not, even though the result should
prove equally fatal.1 And the reason for the distinction lay in the
fact that the former was a deadly weapon whose employment implied
homicidal intent.' 7 So the crime was only complete when an intention
to kill was manifested by an overt act.'
Negligence resulting in death is mentioned as early as the Twelve
Tables, but not as a crime, nor was it visited with a serious penalty.
"One who slays another accidentally," it is declared, 9 "shall provide a
7 Cyc. XXI, 720 et seq.
8Id., 731.
OThe classical American definition is that of Shaw C. J., in Commonwealth
v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711, as follows:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice; and may
be either voluntary, as when the act is committed with a real design and pur-
pose to kill, but through the violence of sudden passion, occasioned by some
great provocation, which in tenderness for the frailty of human nature the law
considers sufficient to palliate the criminality of the offense; or involuntary, as
when the death of another is caused by some unlawful act, not accompanied
by any intention to take life."
10 Blackstone, Commentaries, IV, 191*, 192*; Harris, Criminal Law (3d
ed.) 140, 141,
1- Harris, ubi supra, 141; Cyc. XXI, 760.
12 Blackstone, Commentaries, IV, 192*; Harris, Criminal Law (3d ed.) 141.
13 Stat. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, sec. 5.
14 Harris, Criminal Law (3d ed.) 142.
15 Hunter, Roman Law, 1069.
16 Justinian's Digesta, XLVIII, VIII, I, III.
17 Hunter,. Roman Law, 1069.
18 Paulus, Sentencias, V, XXIII.
10 XII Tables, VIII, 24.
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ram to be sacrificed in his stead." This, as observed by Pliny,2" was
in striking contrast to the imposition by the same table2 of capital
punishment for the relatively moderate offense of "nocturnal trespass
and larceny of crops." Nor does there even appear to have been a
civil liability in such a case. For it was observed in a leading case
under the Modem Civil Law:
"That, as a general principle, no such rule prevailed under the Roman
law, we think, may be affirmed. If it existed, it has escaped the research
of Gibbon and of Makeldy; and the diligence of counsel has referred us to
no text or commentator which authorizes the opinion that the action was
allowed. The Aquilian law gave actions for injury done by the death of
slaves and certain animals, which it mentions by name. The title 'de his
qui offenderint vzel dejecerint,' thus provides for the case of a free man
killed by something being thrown in the public way from a building. If it
is a free man who has been killed, 'danmi aestimatio non aestimatio fieri
potest'; but in this case the fine is of fifty pieces of gold. ff. lib. 9, tit. 3,
par. 3. The law de suspensis is to the same effect, and hiad for its object
the prevention of accidents in the public way. They were penal laws, and
the special provisions they contain are rather in affirmance of the non-ex-
istence of the principle which would give an action to the heir for damages
caused by the death of his ancestor.
"Far be it from us to undertake to state affirmatively, that any given
text is not to be found in the mass of matter composing the corpus juris
civilis. Finding no rule laid down in any of the elementary writers on
which the action could be maintained, and bearing in mind the principle
so frequently recognized in the Digest, that the life of a free man cannot
be made the subject of valuation, we thought that an action of this kind
could not be maintained under the Roman law. Digest 14, tit. 11, De lege
Rhodia de jacta, par. 2, 1. 'lacturae summnam pro rerun pretio distribui
oportet. Corporunt liberorum aestimationem nillam fieri posse.! Digest 9,
tit. 1, par. 4."
22
The development of the idea of culpa (fault or negligence) under
the lex Aquilia supplied this deficiency to some extent in other cases ;23
but it was not, until the period of the Empire that death caused by
negligence was punished as a crime.2 4 And the punishment even then
was a relatively light one, being relegatio the mildest form of banish-
ment which might be for a time only and without forfeiture of goods.25
20 Hist. Nat. XVIII, III, XII.
21 XII Tables, VII, 9.
22 Eustia C. J. in Hubgh v. New Orleans & .Carrolton R. Co., 6 La. Ann.
495, 510.
23 "Under culpa lata is comprehended not only wrong caused wilfully and
intentionally, but also wrong caused by simple imprudence or simple neglect,
when it is gross." Mackenzie, Roman Law (7th ed.) 209.
24 Hunter, Roman Law (5th ed.) 1069; Justinian's Digesta, XLVIII,
Vil, IV, i.
25 Hunter, Roman Law, 1065.
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THE MODERN CIVIL LAW
It was thus that the doctrine of negligence, in its criminal aspect,
passed into the modern civil law. It has always been treated there as
distinct from the ordinary crime of homicide and penalized more
lightly. Thus in the French Penal Code all voluntary homicide is de-
fined as "meutre"2 6 but if committed with premeditation or ambuscade
it becomes "assassinat"2 7 and is visited with capital punishment. 8  On
the other hand involuntary homicide, including that caused by negli-
gence, is treated in a separate part of the code29 and is punished with
imprisonment frdm three months to two years and a fine of from fifty
to six hundred francs so
Similarly under the Spanish Penal Code intentional homicide is
"asesinato" if accompanied by certain circumstances like premedita-
tion, treachery, etc., and may be punished capitally.3 ' In the absence
of these the offense is merely homicidio, punishable with imprison-
ment only.2 But all cases of death resulting from negligence alone
are relegated to a distinct title (XI) of the Code where they are
grouped with other offenses thus resulting and given a light term of
imprisonment with a maximum of six months.32
Chapter XVI of the German Criminal Code defines murder as the
killing of a person "intentionally and with premeditation" and imposes
capital punishment therefor.3 4 Intentional killing without premedita-
tion is treated as ordinary homicide and visited with a maximum
"penal internment" of five years. 5 The last article of the chapter is
devoted to death resultingi from negligence for which "confinement
not exceeding three years is provided. 8
The Penal Code of Japan, like its other present codes, was
modelled upon that of Germany which, like the French. and Spanish,
is a Civil Law instrument. Chapter XXVI of the Japanese Penal
Code treats of (intentional) homicide which may be given capital




29Title II, Ch. I, sec. III.
soArt. 319.
3'Spanish (also Philippine) Penal Code, art. 403.
32ld., arts. 404, et seq.
33Id., 568.
34German Criminal Code, Art. 211.
35M., Art. 212.
36Id., Art. 222.
37japanese Penal Code, Art. 199.
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homicide" which is "punished with a fine not exceeding one thousand
yen.",8
The "Provisional Criminal Code" of China is largely a copy of
the Japanese. Chapters XXVI and XXVIII of the latter have bcen"
combined into one (XXVI) but the two concepts of intentional and
involuntary homicide are still kept entirely distinct. Thus Art. 311
penalizes "murder," i.e., premeditated homicide-with death by penal
servitude; while Art. 313 imposes the latter penalty for injuries re-
sulting in death. Such injuries must, however, be intentional, for such
alone constitute an offense "except in the case of negligence" 39 which,
as in the other codes above mentioned, is treated separately.40
It will thus be seen that homicide as a civil law concept remains
essentially a crime of intent while in common law jurisdictions, homi-
cide includes, under its subclass of "manslaughter," unintentional and
involuntary acts which, if the other system are treated as negligence
and penalized lightly. The relation between the two systems may be





"Murder 20 (without specific
intent to kill)Common




- Civil a hom e Intentional
-Simple homicide But not premeditated
I Negligence independent
38ld., .Art 210.
39Provisional Criminal Code of China, Art. 303.
40Id., Arts. 324, et seq.
